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Stephen R. L. Clark, Ancient Mediterranean Philosophy. An Introduction (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013; xiv+245 pp. ISBN: 9781441123596. £16.99 (P). 
 
For a student who had to work his way through “traditional” textbooks on “Ancient Philo-
sophy” and for whom, in the context of a Philosophy curriculum, “Ancient Philosophy” 
was equivalent to “Ancient Greek”, or more precisely, “Classical and Hellenistic Greek 
Philosophy” (with Plato, Aristotle, and “the Stoics” at the core, and a little bit of Cicero 
added on), the present volume offers a refreshing alternative. One could even call it an 
alternative history of Ancient Philosophy, or Ancient Mediterranean Philosophy, as the 
title aptly specifies. “Mediterranean” here stands for the cultural sphere which unites, 
historically and geographically, all the different influences that make up this “Western” 
phenomenon (as opposed, for example, to comparable phenomena in ancient South or 
East Asia). This is illustrated in the most fascinating way by a map (prepared by Stephen 
Ramsay and printed on p. xiii), which shows the Mediterranean not in the usual way with 
the west on the left and the east on the right, and a clear boundary between sea and land. 
Rather, on this map the east is on the top of the page and the west at the bottom, and the 
boundary between sea and land is merely indicated by a thin black line, while the actual 
boundary, which catches the eye and is indicated by a change in background-colour, runs 
between coastal land and low-lying plains, and “hinterland” of more than 200 m altitude. 
The sea and these low-lying areas are kept in white, the less accessible higher areas are 
shown in grey. These features illustrate far more compellingly than conventional maps 
the geographical factors that determine the importance of landscapes like Egypt, Cyrene, 
Libya and Numidia, the coastal lands of Italy, Sicily, the many islands, southern Gaul and 
the Iberian peninsula, and the proximity of places such as Elea and Syracuse, Miletus and 
Athens, Alexandria and Cyrene, Jerusalem and Heliopolis. 
 Not that traditional approaches to Ancient Philosophy had not shown any awareness 
of the fact that “the Greeks did not invent philosophy” (p. x), but they did seem to rely on 
the assumption that only Classical and Hellenistic Greek philosophy (with its scientific-
rationalist tendencies) ultimately deserved the label, while everything outside that frame, 
be it earlier (in the “archaic” period) or later (in Late Antiquity), or geographically (and, 
moreover, linguistically!) outside the Graeco-Roman sphere (such as Egyptian, Semitic, 
Celtic, Persian and other traditions) was either a rudimentary or a decaying form of that 
“real thing”, especially when it did not keep to a narrowly rationalist stance but engaged 
in metaphysical speculation or religious ritual. Of course, as Clark points out (p. x, and 
see also p. 218f.), already many decades ago scholars such as Martin Bernal, Martin West 
and Thomas McEvilley demonstrated the strong dependence of Greek thought on African 
(Egyptian) and “Oriental” influences, but the controversies which some of these studies 
triggered, and which in some areas continue to this day, just underline the challenge that 
remains even today. 
 Stephen Clark is in an excellent position to take on this challenge. In his studies on 
Aristotle, Plotinus and on ancient philosophical anthropology and theology more widely 
he has for many years contributed to a widening of the view of what can or what should 
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be considered ancient philosophy. This book offers to some extent a synthesis of these 
efforts and a more comprehensive overview of a broad range of themes and historical 
developments. Obviously, an introduction can only do so much. In many areas it may 
only scratch the surface of what may in each case be a whole research area, open to a 
wide range of interdisciplinary possibilities (for example with Archaeology, Oriental 
Studies, Semitic Studies etc.), but the merit of this book is that these strings are held 
together in an attempt to outline possibilities and opportunities which they may provide, 
and also point to their deeper significance and anthropologically and theologically more 
relevant dimensions. 
 The book is divided into ten chapters. The first chapter, “Beginnings”, covers more or 
less the same ground which in traditional parlance is known as “Pre-Socratic Philosophy”. 
But Clark questions the traditional narrative which tends to depict this as a movement 
from “mythos to logos”, from a pre-rational to a rational approach to reality. The world 
into which the pre-socratic philosophers were born (from, say, the seventh century BC 
onwards) was already an ancient world. There were ancient cultures which for several 
thousands of years had tried to provide rational explanations for phenomena such as, for 
example, marine fossil finds in alpine rock formations (pp. 1-2). The fact that many of 
these explanations combined (Clark: “confounded”) down-to-earth reasoning with other-
worldly fascination (note p. 19 the point that the Greek word for “god”, theos, originally 
meant “amazing”) does not per se make them less rational than say, the hyper-rationalist 
explanations (and applications) of some Hellenistic thinkers. “Even if Hippocrates of Cos 
(c450-c375BC) or his disciples helped to define the healer’s art, we had better not use 
their medicines,” Clark writes (p. 21). Our knowledge of ancient knowledge is patchy to 
say the least, he adds. We do not know in what way, if at all, theories influenced practical 
developments. We have next to no accounts of practitioners. Still, the few extant accounts 
of theoreticians might help us to put our present-day “world of science” in perspective. 
Who knows which of our cherished beliefs in “scientific truths” (which seem so obvious 
to many of us today) may yet turn out to be “entirely wrong”, or which “past philosophers 
may really have been correct” (p. 22)? 
 The second chapter (“Influence from outside”) considers this historical fact (namely that 
Greek philosophy, already from its outset, found itself in an ancient world) from a more 
historico-geographical angle. Greek myths contain elements of Mesopotamian epics which 
emerged more than a thousand years earlier, such as those of Atrahasis or Gilgamesh (p. 
24). These epics also influenced the oldest layers of the Hebrew Bible. Already ancient 
Greek accounts drew links between ancient cultural founder figures (Hammurabi, Moses, 
Minos) and acknowledged their indebtedness to Babylonian, Persian, Egyptian and even 
Scythian cultural and scientific achievements (writing, mathematics, astronomy, poetry, 
askesis and divination). But there were also Greek accounts which belittled the barbarian 
achievements and in the name of reason proposed counter-myths according to which the 
savage cultures had no choice but to form modern states in order to survive, or else to end 
up as colonised subjects of modern states. Clark suspects that such “rationalist” counter-
myths as formulated by a range of Greek thinkers (Clark cites a passage from Diodorus as 
an example), could be at least in part politically motivated (p. 54). Perhaps, Clark writes, 
“presently established powers found it convenient to suggest that there was no alternative 
to Leviathan, and that a ‘state-less’ society was a contradiction” (ibid.). 
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 Chapter Three (“Inspired Thinkers”) explores further the source of rational thinking, 
which is itself beyond reason and found in those who are divinely inspired. While some 
held (already in Antiquity) that man created gods in his own image, Clark points out that 
some of the most respected religions in Antiquity, among them the religion of the Jews 
and Zoroastrianism, “denied that God could be pictured” (p. 56). Divine knowledge was 
for those inspired by the divine, and even those had to empty and purify themselves and 
exceed the highest ethical and intellectual standards. The fact that in the case of Judaism 
this experience shaped a whole culture and its legal and social structure led ancients to 
conclude “that the Jews were a ‘nation of philosophers’” (p. 79). But the phenomenon 
was shared across virtually all ancient religions and includes such diverse personages as 
Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Isaiah, Diogenes and Parmenides. 
 Chapter Four (“Travellers and stay-at-homes”) contrasts those who as philosophers 
took up a nomadic way of life with those who “stayed at home”, in the service of their 
fatherland. Again, this leads to interesting connections: The Sophists as mercenaries of 
the truth, or whatever could be sold as such, Socrates and Plato as patriots; but Socrates 
was not above suspicion; for although he was a loyal resident citizen (and even soldier), 
he was also aspiring to a higher truth, which made his sophistries not just a nuisance, but 
a threat to Athenian self-delusion and literally intolerable to the harassed Athenians, who 
put Socrates on trial and condemned him to death. But prepared even for that eventuality 
Socrates, as recorded in Plato’s dialogue Phaedo, recommended the “practice of death” 
(p. 92) as a philosophical exercise, a way of purification to attain a higher state of being 
(and intellect). Towards the end of the chapter Clark once more draws a link between this 
exceptional attitude towards philosophy and the concept of purity in the Hebrew Bible as 
a necessary pre-condition of being close to God, as was the collective “call” of the people 
of Israel, the “philosopher-nation” mentioned earlier (pp. 97-101). 
 The following three chapters enter that “conventional” ground of the study of ancient 
Greek philosophy referred to at the beginning of this review. “Divine Plato” (Chapter Five) 
briefly introduces the Dialogues and discusses the notion of Form and the problem of the 
“two worlds”. It ends with a section on politics. “The Aristotelian synthesis” (Chapter Six) 
moves on to Plato’s greatest pupil, “the master of them that know” (p. 125). Much space 
here is dedicated to Aristotle the naturalist, to the question of slavery, and to the issue of 
Aristotle’s legacy, especially in view of what it means to be a philosopher, in “practical” 
(scientific, intellectual, ethical, religious and social-political) terms. This leads straight on 
to Chapter Seven, “Living the philosophical life”, an account of the Hellenistic Schools, 
which in the spirit of the present book includes not only Stoics, Cynics and Epicureans, 
but also Hebrews, Zoroastrians and Buddhists. 
 Chapter Eight, following the natural time-line, leads on to the Romans. It is entitled 
“Ordinary and supernatural lives” and begins with a discussion of the phenomenon that 
Romans worshipped abstract virtues as deities, such as Liberty, Faith, and Peace. Much 
of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of Cicero’s reserved scepticism in the light of 
his countrymen’s hands-on approach to religion in daily life, the widespread practice of 
divination and the link between religion (or superstition) and technology. This chapter is 
also covering the period when Christianity began to establish itself in Rome (during the 
second century AD) and to develop its doctrine of the incarnation of God’s eternal Son, 
or Word, as a special case of the above-mentioned proximity between God and humanity. 
As was mentioned earlier with a reference, for example, to Socrates, and as is reiterated 
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here with a reference to Apollonius of Tyana, the idea of philosophers achieving divine 
status through acts of extreme self-denial was not alien to the intellectual culture of the 
day. But the Christian claim that Jesus, on account of the story of his life and death, was 
identical with the eternal God, went way over the top in the view of many and was met 
with the deepest suspicion. Significantly, the question as to the exact nature of that claim 
was highly controversial among the Christians themselves, for centuries to come. 
 Chapter Nine moves on to “Late Antiquity”. Clark here begins with a brief reflection 
on the traditional view that this period was obsessed with Fate and its “management”, for 
example, through astrology. He believes that this view was exaggerated and he introduces 
a number of cases, Plotinus among them, who argued against the Fatalism of astrological 
practices. Still, late-antique philosophy lost some of its clarity and brevity and became 
cluttered with all manner of knowledge and wisdom accrued through many centuries of 
learning and from many cultures. Clark considers Oswald Spengler’s view that alongside 
Classical culture there existed in the late-antique Mediterranean a “Magian” intellectual 
culture which introduced emotional, communal and ritual elements into the essentially 
rationalist Classical philosophical tradition and thus developed it into a religion. Clark 
poses the question whether this pagan philosophical tradition might have been a more 
tolerant alternative to the ultimately victorious Christian Orthodoxy, or later, to Islam. 
 To some extent an answer to this question is given in Chapter Ten, “An end and a 
beginning”. Ancient Mediterranean Philosophy was not extinguished, but persisted, if 
only as a largely “hidden”, subtle, sublime, phenomenon. Jan Assmann recently coined 
for it the phrase religio duplex, a second, subliminal, layer of religion beneath popular 
beliefs and practices, the “religion” of those few in every given age who “know” that 
popular religion cannot provide final answers and that any belief to be in possession of 
the ultimate truth can be no adequate substitute for the honest and persistent pursuit of 
truth, the “love of wisdom” (which is the meaning of philosophy), which will never be 
complete in this life. Clark shows that in this respect philosophy has probably never held 
a dominant position in any society and he poignantly hints at the similarity of the rhetoric 
used by a modern scientist, who declares all previous worldviews erroneous and obsolete, 
with that of an early Christian Church Father, who presents his own doctrine as a victory 
of the enlightenment over the illusions and fantasies of a benighted past. 
 This relatively brief summary cannot do justice to the rich content of this book, be it 
the amount of historical material covered, or the level of philosophical investigation into 
individual questions. A brief section recommends further reading (pp. 217-219), and an 
extensive bibliography and index of names and subjects conclude the volume. 
 Ancient Mediterranean Philosophy is a fascinating and highly instructive book, which 
can be recommended to any reader at any level, who not only wants to “know about” the 
history of philosophy in Antiquity, but in the process of learning about it would also like 
to learn how to practise philosophy in their own lives. 
 
Josef Lössl, Cardiff University (LosslJ@cardiff.ac.uk) 
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Jörg Trelenberg, Tatianos. Oratio ad Graecos. Rede an die Griechen (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2012); x + 308 pp. 
 
The present volume is the most substantial treatment of Tatian’s Oratio ad Graecos for 
some time. It offers a newly edited Greek text with an annotated translation (pp. 84-193) 
and introductory chapters on the following topics: 1) The author (pp. 1-8), 2) Date and 
place of origin (pp. 8-15), 3) The transmission of the work (pp. 15-24), 4) Its Structure 
(pp. 25-29), 5) Its Theology (including Creation, Logos speculation, Pneumatology, De-
monology, Anthropology and Ethics, pp. 29-54), 6) Its merits as an Apology (including 
polemics against philosophy, mythology and astrology, and defence of the concept of a 
“Barbarian Philosophy”, pp. 54-71). In addition there are five appendices: 1) Was Tatian 
a pupil of Justin Martyr (pp. 195-203)? 2) Was he a Gnostic (pp. 204-219)? 3) Why is the 
name of Christ not mentioned in the work (pp. 219-224)? 4) Who were the addressees of 
the work (pp. 224-230)? And 5) What is the genre of the work (pp. 230-240)? The book 
concludes with a bibliography and indices of biblical, classical and patristic references, 
names and Greek words, ancient and modern authors, and subjects. 
 One of the most noteworthy features of the work is the new critical text: Trelenberg’s 
aim is to restore it to a more pristine condition, closer to the manuscript tradition, after it 
experienced a radical makeover by Miroslav Marcovich’s critical edition of 1995, which 
contains more than 300 additional conjectures. But Trelenberg also rejects a number of 
earlier conjectures found in Eduard Schwartz’s edition of 1888, some of them by Ulrich 
von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf and Robert Münzel, and some made by yet earlier editors. 
This strategy has its merits, but also its limitations, as some examples may illustrate. It 
also happens in a context. Already Aimé Puech, Edgar Goodspeed and Molly Whittaker, 
in 1903, 1914 and 1982, produced editions (or translations based on readings) which did 
not accept Schwartz’s philologically refined text but preferred manuscript readings and 
lectio difficilior. They all relied on Schwartz, though. Schwartz’s work was a pioneering 
achievement made possible in turn by a study of Adolf Harnack’s published in 1882 on 
the manuscript tradition. This had established that all extant manuscripts originate from 
one 10
th
 c. manuscript, now lost, after the quires containing the text were removed at an 
early stage from the relevant codex, Paris, BnF, ms. gr. 451, the so-called codex Arethas. 
The extent to which the extant text of Tatian’s Ad Graecos could be improved with the 
help of manuscript readings was therefore rather limited. This had made Harnack very 
cautious. In a translation of the text based on von Otto’s edition of 1851, published in 
1884, Harnack included text-critical notes which did not allow for a single conjecture. 
Trelenberg (p. 21, n. 108) is quite correct when he speaks of Harnack’s “valuable (partly 
ingenious) text-critical observations”. The emphasis here is on the word “observations”, 
as opposed to “interventions”. Harnack rejected those. In contrast, Schwartz, Wilamowitz 
and Münzel felt that the text could be significantly improved by some bold, philologically 
informed conjectures, and a century later Marcovich escalated this approach by making 
on average five additional changes on every page, one in every 20
th
 word or phrase, thus 
in effect re-writing whole swaths of the work. 
 Against this trend Puech, Goodspeed and Whittaker followed the tradition of von Otto 
and Harnack, and they are now joined by Trelenberg, who states his editorial principles as 
follows (p. 21): “The manuscript readings are, wherever possible and tolerable, preferred 
to speculation. Moderate conjecture is used in unambiguous cases of textual corruption 
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[italics are Trelenberg’s]. Lectio difficilior is not shunned, though exaggerations – as by 
Kukula – are avoided.” The reference here is to Richard Kukula’s German translation of 
1913, which was very influential, but eccentric in places. But, as the following examples 
might illustrate, Trelenberg also adds his own touch. There are some significant changes 
compared to, say, Whittaker; and in some cases he even agrees with conjectures made by 
Marcovich. (Abbreviations used are of the three main manuscript witnesses: P = Paris, 
BnF, ms. gr. 174 (s. xi/xii); M = Modena, BE, GRE. 126 (s. xi); V = Venice, BnM, cod. 
gr. z. 343 (s. xi). Tatian’s Ad Graecos is abbreviated “or.”): 
 Or. 1.1: ὦ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες P, V, Trelenberg; ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες Whittaker. This is a tiny 
detail, but symptomatic. The omission of ὦ is the more difficult reading and backed by M, 
which many editors consider the best witness, which explains Whittaker’s choice. But 
Trelenberg follows P, V, and most earlier editions. 
 Or. 1.4: σύμφυρτον ὑμῶν πεποιήκατε τὴν διάλεκτον Marcovich, Trelenberg; literally, 
“you have made your speech confused/messy” (scil. by importing foreign expressions). 
Here P, M and V read συμφύρδην, as do Schwartz and Whittaker, i. e. exponents of both 
“camps” of modern editors. Before Marcovich suggested σύμφυρτον, only von Otto had 
come up with any emendation at all, συμφύρτην. But no emendation is needed here. Both 
readings of the adjective, σύμφυρδος and σύμφυρτος, are attested in ancient literature. The 
ending too is correct; ἡ διάλεκτος is feminine. Marcovich’s intervention is gratuitous, al-
beit typical. It is the fact that Trelenberg follows Marcovich in this instance which comes as 
a surprise. It goes against his declared editorial strategy. 
 Or. 7.4: Καὶ ἐπειδή τινι φρονιμωτέρῳ ... συνεξηκολούθησαν καὶ θεὸν ἀνέδειξαν ... οἱ 
ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἄγγελοι τὸν ἐπανιστάμενον τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ... “But when men and angels 
followed someone who was cleverer [scil. than the other celestial beings, because he was 
προτόγονος] and proclaimed him a god, although he had revolted against God’s law...”. 
The issue here is with ἄγγελοι, which is absent from the manuscripts. Schwartz inserted it 
to fill the apparent lacuna between καὶ and τόν, and later editors, including Whittaker and 
Trelenberg, were happy to follow him. This reading reinforces the impression of Tatian’s 
account of creation through the Logos as a kind of Gnostic myth, which Trelenberg shares 
(pp. 34-40), but which is problematic.
1
 In an article published in 2005, not referenced by 
Trelenberg, Heinz-Günther Nesselrath suggested that Schwartz’s insertion of ἄγγελοι might 
be quite unnecessary if we read καὶ τὸν as καί τοι, “although”.2 This is a possibility which 
points beyond Trelenberg’s text. 
 Or. 7.5: ...διὰ δὲ τὴν παράβασιν καὶ τὴν ἄνοιαν ὁ πρωτόγονος δαίμων ἀποδείκνυται. 
“Because of his transgression and his madness the Firstborn was appointed [or ‘shown to 
be’] a demon.” Here Trelenberg, following a conjecture by von Otto, reads ἄνοια, “folly, 
madness”, but P, M and V read ἄγνοια, “ignorance, stupidity”. According to Trelenberg’s 
stated editorial strategy there should be no reason not to follow the manuscripts here. 
                                                 
1
 See Lössl, J., “Zwischen Christologie und Rhetorik. Zum Ausdruck ‘Kraft des Wortes’ (λόγου 
δύναμις) in Tatians Rede an die Griechen,“ in: Prostmeier, F., H. Lona (eds), Logos der Vernunft – 
Logos des Glaubens. Edgar Früchtel zum 80. Geburtstag (Berlin, New York, 2010), pp. 129-147. 
2
 See Nesselrath, H.-G., “Il testo di Taziano, Oratio ad Graecos, e due recenti edizioni,” in: 
Eikasmos 16 (2005), pp. 243-263 at pp. 248-250. The two editions to which Nesselrath refers are 
the critical edition of Marcovich (published in 1995) and the translation of Salvatore Di Cristina, 
Taziano il Siro. Discorso ai Greci (Rome, 1991). 
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 Or. 9.5: ...εἶτα πῶς πρὶν τούτους περὶ τὰς προειρημένας τάξεις γενέσθαι ἀκόσμητος ἦν 
ὁ οὐρανός; “How’s that, then? Was the sky without ornaments before these [scil. the con-
stellations] emerged around the predestined places?” Τάξεις, here “places”, was suggested 
by Wilamowitz and endorsed by Trelenberg (as it had been by Whittaker). P, M and V 
read πράξεις, “deeds”, which also makes sense; for in this passage Tatian ridicules the 
idea that the stellar constellations are manifestations of ancient myths, “deeds” committed 
by specific gods and men. In this case περὶ could be translated as “with regard to” or “in 
relation to”, so that the sentence could be translated: “…Was the sky without ornaments 
before these [constellations] emerged in relation to the aforementioned deeds?” 
 Or. 27.2: Διαγόρας ἄθεος ἦν Kukula, Trelenberg; Διαγόρας Ἀθηναῖος ἦν P, M, V. In 
this case it is possible that ἄθεος is the original reading and that ἀθηναῖος is the result of a 
copyist’s error. (The word ἀθηναίοις occurs on the next line.) Ἄθεος makes better sense, 
since Tatian continues to say that Diagoras poked fun at the Mysteries celebrated among 
the Athenians. It is generally known that this lead to the notorious trial against Diagoras 
for “Atheism”. But Tatian does not mention the trial, nor does he use the word ἄθεος in 
this technical sense anywhere else in Ad Graecos. The assumption that ἄθεος is the most 
authentic reading here is pure conjecture. Significantly, Schwartz and Whittaker stick to 
Ἀθηναῖος. But the word has troubled others; for Diagoras was of course not an Athenian, 
but a Melian. Friedrich Jacoby therefore suggested the reading Μήλιος for Ἀθηναῖος, 
while Marcovich, true to his editorial strategy, suggested Διαγόρας Ἀθηναῖος ἄθεος ἦν. 
 Or. 31.2: Μάρτυρας δὲ οὐ τοὺς οἴκοι παραλήψομαι, βοηθοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον Ἕλλησι κατα-
χρήσομαι. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄγνωμον (ὅτι μηδὲ ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν παραδεκτόν), τὸ δ᾽ἂν ἀποδεικνύηται 
θαυμαστόν, ὁπόταν ὑμῖν διὰ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὅπλων ἀντερείδων ἀνυπόπτους παρ᾽ ὑμῶν τοὺς 
έλέγχους παραλαμβάνω. For this passage, Trelenberg, following Schwartz, relies on the 
indirect transmission of the text in Eusebius, praep. ev. 10.11.1-5, which deviates from P, 
M and V in many details. But he does not follow Schwartz, and Schwartz does not follow 
Eusebius, in every detail. Take, for example, the expression in brackets. Here Schwartz, 
following P, M and V, reads ἡμῶν instead of ὑμῶν. Trelenberg may have intended to do the 
same; for his translation reads, “weil nicht einmal bei uns beweiskräftig”; but his text reads 
ὑμῶν, not ἡμῶν. Thus his translation follows the manuscripts, like Schwartz in this case, 
but his text follows Eusebius, against Schwartz. There is obviously some mistake here; but 
one could ask beyond that, as Nesselrath has done,
3
 whether it is at all necessary for this 
passage to resort to the Eusebius-tradition in order to “improve” the text of P, M and V. We 
can read χρήσομαι instead of καταχρήσομαι, παραδεκτέον instead of παραδεκτόν, ὅταν 
instead of ὁπόταν, and λαμβάνω instead of παραλαμβάνω. A translation following these 
variants (provided by P, M and V) could read as follows: “As witnesses I will not take 
any of our own people, but rather make use of the partisans of the Greeks; for the former 
would be unwise (since not acceptable even by ourselves), while it might strike as rather 
impressive if I withstood you with your own weapons and resorted to arguments which are 
above suspicion even among you.” 
 Or. 34.3: διὰ Περικλύμενον Marcovich, Trelenberg; διὰ τὸ περικλύμενον P, M, V; διὰ 
τὸν Περικλύμενον Gesner (editio princeps), von Otto, Harnack, Schwartz, Whittaker. This 
may be a case of lectio difficilior against manuscripts. Clearly, the majority went with the 
                                                 
3
 Nesselrath, “Il testo,” p. 254-255. 
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latter, making a slight emendation, while Trelenberg, following Marcovich, went in the 
other direction. (There are several more such cases in cc. 32-36.) 
 These few examples can only provide a glimpse of what is a most welcome and useful 
new edition. They suggest, however, that at least in some cases it may be worth comparing 
Trelenberg’s text with that of earlier editions, at least with Schwartz’s and Whittaker’s; 
for Trelenberg does occasionally make decisions that are not in line with his own editorial 
strategy and seem unnecessarily to depart from the manuscripts, or prefer a perhaps con-
venient but doubtful conjecture. One wonders whether it is an inevitable side-effect of the 
proliferation of critical editions (in this particular case) that ultimately none of them can 
be relied upon with certainty. A final verdict on this question will probably have to wait 




 Just a few more notes on the introductory and thematic chapters: These too are of solid 
quality. But research is progressing fast and in many directions. It cannot be expected of a 
volume such as this to cover every possible angle in its treatment of the relevant sources. 
However, the omission of certain themes and topics has repercussions for the remaining 
material, and of this any reader should be aware. For example, there are no sections here 
on Tatian’s use of and engagement with the Bible, or on his rhetorical theory and method, 
or on the cultural-intellectual context in which these may have been conveyed. Tatian is 
believed to have stood in some kind of teaching tradition located in Rome. Justin Martyr 
is believed to have been a teacher of his, Rhodon one of his pupils. A discussion between 
Rhodon and Apelles, a pupil of Marcion, is recorded by Eusebius in his Church History. 
These things and many more are important to consider for the argument of Ad Graecos, 
but they lie beyond Trelenberg’s scope. Regarding the date and place of Ad Graecos, for 
example, Trelenberg merely records the different theories (Rome, Athens, “the East”) and 
is inclined towards “the East” and a late date, i. e. after 172 (p. 15), but then adds that this 
applies only to the “Endredaktion” of the work. He therefore implies that some parts of 
Ad Graecos may well have originated in Rome and its theological context, but when he 
discusses the relevant parts, this is not always sufficiently taken into account. The simple 
personification of the notion of λόγου δύναμις (“word-power”), for example, as a “Wesen 
sui generis” (p. 36) does not do justice to the complexity of this concept in the context of 
both the Christian Theology of the time and of the Second Sophistic with its rich culture 
of rhetorical theorizing. Trelenberg’s personification leads to a simplification of Tatian’s 
thought which does not do justice to the level of his hermeneutical thinking, evident, for 
example, in the way he explains the interaction of semantic meaning and physical sound 
in the acts of speaking and listening (or. 5.5). There is a danger here of “mythologizing” 
something which evidently is not meant to be mythological. Tatian’s “power of the word” 
is not a separate being in addition to God and the Logos, as Trelenberg’s account seems 
to suggest, but a theological concept developed to explain the relationship between God 
and the Word in analogy to what we know about the way human language works. 
 This tendency to read the theological parts of Ad Graecos mythologically is mirrored 
in the way heresiological accounts are taken at face value in the chapter dealing with the 
question whether Tatian was a Gnostic (pp. 204-219). There is a connection between the 
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two observations that all that ancient heresiologists have to say about Tatian’s Gnosticism 
and other heresies is ultimately derived from Irenaeus and that all that Irenaeus says about 
Tatian in that regard can be evidenced from Ad Graecos. “There is nothing in Tatian that 
cannot also be found in any other Apologist,” Trelenberg concedes (p. 217). Still, “only a 
well-meaning interpretation will situate him within ecclesiastical orthodoxy; in individual 
cases he definitely strays outside this context” (p. 219). Trelenberg may just try to be fair 
here and provide a balanced account, but recent studies such as Naomi Koltun-Fromm’s5 
have shown that the view that Tatian was a heretic, which includes the charge that he was 
a Gnostic, is entirely a construction. There is no balance to strike here. As Trelenberg’s 
own evidence shows, it begins with Irenaeus and ends with Arethas, author of the tenth 
century Scholia Arethae, who saw Tatian as a proto-Arian on account of or. 5.2, where 
the Logos is called the “work” (ἔργον) of the Father. The fact that Trelenberg (p. 37f.) 
“defends” Tatian against this charge, while he nevertheless feels “irritated” by Tatian’s 
use of the expression indicates how close he still is to that tradition and how much he is 
in danger of simply continuing the heresiological narrative instead of subjecting it to a 
thorough critique. Yet again, admittedly, to provide such a critique may not be the primary 
task of an introductory chapter in a volume such as this. 
 Finally, some notes on the brief section dealing with the question of the genre of the 
work (pp. 230-240). On p. 15 Trelenberg rightly points out that Ad Graecos is composed 
of quite diverse elements (didactic, polemical, archival materials etc.), which originated 
over a longer period of time and were at some later point subjected to an “Endredaktion”. 
Tatian himself hints at this, when he speaks or. 37.2 of having begun to write that part of 
the work at an earlier stage and now taking it up again after abandoning it for some time, 
and or. 42.1 of having “arranged” (συνέταξα) his material rather than having written it in 
one go. On pp. 231-233, however, when he criticizes Kukula’s ideas regarding a possible 
school-context for an oral presentation of certain parts of the speech, Trelenberg seems to 
have forgotten his earlier observation and calls in question a possible school context on 
the ground that it is not at all certain that Tatian founded a school in “the East”. But if Ad 
Graecos contains earlier material as well, surely it could contain material which Tatian 
might have delivered at some point during his Roman period. 
 Then the question regarding addressees: Were they “outsiders” or “insiders”? “Real” 
Greeks (i. e. “pagans”) Trelenberg asserts, “would hardly have listened to his [Tatian’s] 
tirades” (p. 233). But then he concedes (p. 237) that Ad Graecos is at least at some level a 
protreptic, which “by definition is directed towards outsiders (Aussenstehende)” (ibid.). 
The outsider-insider question is also raised with regard to Tatian himself, a convert in 
constant need of “self-assurance” (“Selbstvergewisserung”), for himself as well as for 
those close to him. (Οἴκοι is a term repeatedly used in that regard, or. 1.3; 31.2.) Again, 
according to recent studies it is problematic to draw a clear line between Christian and 
non-Christian identities during this period. Tatian’s oration reflects a context of cultural 
encounter and exchange. The struggle between Greek and Barbarian philosophy is one in 
which the author of Ad Graecos is familiar with both sides. He is crossing borders, and 
his work reflects this. For the same reason “Apology” and the other possible genres such 
as protreptic, polemic, apodeictic etc. should not be considered mutually exclusive. The 
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expression “apology” was used in Antiquity for a literary genre, as was, by distinction, Ad 
Graecos, Πρὸς Ἕλληνας. But the ancient approach to rhetoric was pragmatic and guided 
by “communicative strategies”. Thus a work could well be at the same time an ἀπολογία, 
a λόγος πρὸς Ἕλληνας, and a προτρεπτικός, and even contain strong elements of ψόγος, a 
“speech of blame”. It all depended on the rhetorical strategy of the work, or different parts 
of the work, if the work was a composite, as is probably the case here, or on the author’s 
strategy of communicating with his audience. 
 Once more, it cannot be expected from such brief introductory chapters exhaustively 
to explore all the relevant aspects of the topics that suggest themselves from the study of 
Tatian’s Ad Graecos. The above remarks are merely hints to outline possible avenues of 
further inquiry, which Trelenberg’s volume will hopefully encourage. 
 To conclude, therefore, the merit of this volume is beyond doubt. It serves the study of 
Tatian’s Ad Graecos in so many respects and is warmly recommended to any student of 
early Christianity, the Second Sophistic, the second-century Greek Christian Apologists 
and related areas. 
 A (thankfully brief, though probably incomplete) list of errata: p. 20, l. 20: Whittaker; 
p. 23, n. [1]: praep. ev. 10,11,6-35 (the correct reference is given on p. 19 n. 101); p. 23, 
n. [2]: The last number on the line should be 41; p. 83, l. 26: For 1517 read 1592; p. 139, 
n. 220: Read “A. E. Osborne, Discourse”; also on p. 258: A. E. Osborne and E. F. Osborn 
(“From Justin to Origen”) are two different authors; p. 244: Stählin; p. 258: Pilhofer, P.: 
Presbyteron Kreitton. 
 
Josef Lössl, Cardiff University (LosslJ@cardiff.ac.uk) 
 
 
